Honoring the Legacies of Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall by Stone, Geoffrey R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2010
Honoring the Legacies of Justices William J.
Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall
Geoffrey R. Stone
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey R. Stone, "Honoring the Legacies of Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall," 43 Indiana Law Review
441 (2010).
Indiana Law Review
Volume 43 2010 Number 2
PANEL DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT
HONORING THE LEGACIES OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.,
AND JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
A PANEL DISCUSSION PRESENTED BY THE






When the Honorable Thurgood Marshall was asked in 1987 to reflect on the
200th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution, he did so not with the blind patriotism
that might be expected of a man who had spent the greatest portion of his life
celebrating the document's intricacies but with a "sensitive understanding of the
Constitution's inherent defects."' The founders of our nation, after all, penned
the most important stanzas of our Constitution in a world in which slavery still
existed, one in which it could not have been imagined that a woman would one
day sit together with an African American on our highest Bench. The "true
miracle" that Justice Marshall saw fit to idolize, "was not the birth of the
Constitution, but its life, a life nurtured through two turbulent centuries of our
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own making, and a life embodying much good fortune that was not.",2 Two years
earlier, the Honorable William Brennan, Jr., had articulated precisely the judicial
philosophy that gave birth to Justice Marshall's "miracle": "[T]he genius of the
Constitution," said Justice Brennan, "rests not in any static meaning it might have
had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles
to cope with current problems and current needs."3
It is this philosophy that has guided progressive thought-both judicial and
extra-judicial-through more than half a century, and one that has seen no greater
standard-bearers than Justices Brennan and Marshall. The span of thirty-five
years from Justice Brennan's confirmation to Justice Marshall's retirement saw
nearly unimaginable strides taken in the areas of voting rights,4 procedural due
process,5 equal protection,6 free speech,7 and criminal procedure.8 This era saw
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a prohibition on the distribution of
contraceptives, 9 the recognition of a constitutional right to abortion," and a four-
year hiatus on executions in the United States." It saw, above all, a revitalization
in the ability of law to mirror social and political progress.
In a partial dissent written well into his tenure on the Court, Justice Marshall
(joined, of course, by Justice Brennan) penned words that would encapsulate this
dramatic-and unprecedented-expansion of rights. "Courts," he wrote,
do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral philosophers may debate
whether certain inequalities are absolute wrongs, but history makes clear
that constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of
liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time; what once was a
"natural" and "self-evident" ordering later comes to be seen as an
2. Id.
3. Byron R. White, Tribute, Tribute to Honorable William J Brennan, Jr., 100 YALE L.J.
1113, 1116(1991).
4. See, e.g., Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
6. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 489
(1965); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
8. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom.
Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come to make past
practices appear inconsistent with fundamental principles upon which
American society rests.12
Thus, although-in the words of Justice Brennan-the safeguards enshrined in
the Bill of Rights "are deeply etched in the foundations of America's freedoms,"' 3
these safeguards are rendered altogether meaningless if they are not valued,
guarded, and occasionally expanded. Over the course of our nation's history, few
have acted as such staunch guardians as have these two giants of U.S.
jurisprudence.
On February 23, 2010, the Indianapolis Lawyer Chapter of the American
Constitution Society was proud to present a discussion on the legacies of Justices
Brennan and Marshall and the future of the Court. We are indebted first and
foremost to the Indiana Supreme Court and Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard for
graciously opening its doors to this discussion and for playing the role of host.
We wish to also express our gratitude to each of the panelists for their insights,
their stories, and their overwhelming eagerness to participate in this discussion.
We therefore thank each of our outstanding panelists for their invaluable
contributions: Justice Theodore R. Boehm; Professor Geoffrey R. Stone;
Professor Mark V. Tushnet; and our superb moderator, Professor Rosalie Berger
Levinson, who set the table for a robust discussion. Each panelist served with
distinction as a law clerk on the U.S. Supreme Court, and we owe them each an
additional debt of gratitude for the roles they have played in helping to shape our
constitutional jurisprudence. We would also like to thank the Indianapolis law
firms of Baker & Daniels LLP and Bose McKinney & Evans LLP for their
generous donations in support of this program. Finally, we wish to thank both the
Indiana University-Indianapolis Law School Chapter of the American
Constitution Society and the Indiana Law Review, for assistance in preparing and
organizing this discussion and for agreeing to publish its contents, respectively.
Five years before his retirement, Justice Brennan commented that a judge
should proceed with "a sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity
of every individual,"'" and it is with respect for this spirit in mind that we hope
to do our part to honor the legacies of two of our nation's greatest jurists.
12. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,466 (1985) (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (internal
citations omitted).
13. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 776
(1961).





Date: February 23, 2010
Location: Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Indiana
PANELISTS:
Professor Rosalie Berger Levinson, Moderator, Phyllis and Richard
Duesenberg Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law
Professor Mark V. Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service
Professor, University of Chicago Law School
The Honorable Theodore R. Boehm, Associate Justice, Indiana Supreme
Court
PROFESSOR LEVINSON.-
There has been much discussion recently about what the role of the Supreme
Court should be in interpreting the Constitution. The Heller case, 6 which gave
new meaning to the Second Amendment right to bear arms, reinvigorated the
battle between those who espouse an originalist interpretation with its various
permutations-looking to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, the intent
of those who ratified it, or "the public meaning,"-and those who espouse the
"living Constitution." Let me quote Justice Brennan's description: "The genius
of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it may have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and present needs."' 7
It is clear that Justice Brennan, as well as Justice Marshall and Justice
Warren, endorsed the living Constitution, or what Professor Michael Dorf at
Cornell calls "aspirational constitutionalism"'-the notion that those who framed
the original text understood that the open-ended values set forth in our
Constitution would not be realized at the time of its adoption. This would be left
to later generations, and the Justices who interpret the document should be guided
by this understanding. Indeed, Justice Brennan referred to the Constitution as the
"lodestar of our aspirations.' 19
15. This transcript has been edited for clarity and brevity's sake. The original transcript was
transcribed by ClearPoint Legal, Indianapolis, Indiana.
16. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
17. REASON & PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 18 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997).
18. Michael C. Doff, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1631 (2009).
19. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the
Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), available at http://www.
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Justice Marshall shared this aspirational vision. Thurgood Marshall, first as
an advocate for twenty-five years for the NAACP and later as a Justice, truly
framed the constitutional right to racial equality-a right that most of the Framers
likely never envisioned as barring de jure segregation, white primaries, or racially
restricted covenants. Of course, advocate Marshall was assisted in achieving the
goal of equal educational opportunity by Chief Justice Earl Warren, who penned
the famous Brown v. Board of Education" decision, and later Justice Brennan,
whose decisions helped implement the desegregation mandate.
In the same way, Justice Brennan assisted advocate Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
framing the constitutional right to gender equality-again, a right that was not
envisioned by the Framers, who would have been surprised to know that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited sex bias. Ruth Bader Ginsburg as advocate
and Justice Brennan as author of key decisions in the 1970s, were the real framers
of the constitutional right to gender equality, just as the true framers of the right
to racial equality were Thurgood Marshall, as an advocate and later as Justice, as
well as Earl Warren. As Professor Doff put it, "the success of the civil rights
movement in the twentieth century . . . was [really] a jurisgenerative
accomplishment."'" And the Justices we honor today were at the center of that
movement.
Justice Marshall served on the Supreme Court from 1967 to 1991, and he
began his aspirational work as an advocate back in the 1930s. Justice Brennan
served on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, from 1956 to 1990, a time
spanning eight Presidencies. He authored over 1500 decisions. Rather than
examining all 1500, I will just focus on some key decisions handed down when
our guest speakers were clerking for their justices.
During the 1972-73 Term when Professor Tushnet and Professor Stone
served as law clerks, Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion in Frontiero
v. Richardson,2  asserting for the first time that strict scrutiny should be the
standard for judging the validity of laws that classified based on gender. He
never got the fifth vote for strict scrutiny, but he clearly was instrumental in
moving the Court towards recognizing, as Justice Ginsburg put it, that "our living
Constitution obligates government to respect women and men as persons of equal
stature and dignity."23
A second Brennan opinion that Term, perhaps less well known, invalidated
an amendment to the Federal Food Stamp Program, which denied benefits to
households with unrelated occupants.24 Congress wanted to ensure that hippie
communes would not receive food stamps.25 Justice Brennan announced the core
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=-2342.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Dorf, supra note 18, at 1648.
22. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
23. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Closing Remarks for Symposium on "Justice Brennan and the
Living Constitution," 95 CAL. L. REv. 2217, 2219 (2007).
24. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
25. Id. at 534.
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principle that the Equal Protection Clause must mean, at minimum, that, "a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest., 26 It was this language that was invoked thirty
years later by Justice Kennedy to strike down the Texas sodomy law.27
During this same eventful Term, the Supreme Court handed down the
extremely controversial decision in Roe v. Wade28 on abortion, and in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,29 it sustained local property
taxes as a means to finance public education, despite the gross disparities in
educational opportunity that this produced-triggering a vigorous and poignant
dissent by Justice Marshall.30
Finally, when Theodore Boehm was clerking for Chief Justice Warren during
the 1963-64 Term, the Chief Justice authored the opinion in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,3 providing significant protection for the press from libel actions
brought by government officials, and Reynolds v. Sims,3 2 declaring the "one
person, one vote"33 principle, which completely altered the face of democracy in
this country.
Obviously, we have much to discuss this afternoon. I want to begin by
briefly introducing our three extraordinarily accomplished panelists.
To my far left, Justice Theodore Boehm,34 who has served on the Indiana
Supreme Court since 1996. He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard, where
he served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review, and then assumed the position
as law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 1963 Term. After that, he
worked for Baker & Daniels, becoming a partner in 1970 and managing partner
in 1980. He worked also for General Electric and the Eli Lilly Company. Today,
he serves on numerous boards and commissions. And, Justice, we are very
fortunate to have you as a member of our Supreme Court.
Geoffrey Stone3' has been a member of the University of Chicago Law
School's faculty since 1973. He served both as Dean of the Law School and
Provost of the University of Chicago. After law school, he clerked for Judge
Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals before assuming his
position with Justice Brennan. He has written numerous books and articles in the
area of constitutional law, and has received several national book awards. In
2006, he helped organize and participate in a symposium honoring the legacy of
26. Id.
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
30. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33. Id. at 587 (Clark., J., concurring) (citing Gray v. Sanders, 312 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
34. Indiana Supreme Court Justice Biographies: Justice Theodore R. Boehm, http://www.in.
gov/judiciary/suupreme/bios/boehm.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
35. Geoffrey R. Stone/University of Chicago Law School, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/stone-g/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
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Justice Brennan, sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice, an organization
founded by former law clerks to continue the wonderful work of the Justice.
Among Professor Stone's many public activities, he is a member of the National
Board of Directors of the American Constitution Society, our host, as well as a
member of the National Advisory Council of the ACLU.
Mark Tushnet has been a law professor at Harvard Law School since 2006,
following lengthy stints at the University of Wisconsin Law School and at
Georgetown, where he served as Associate Dean. He clerked for Thurgood
Marshall during the 1972 Term, while Professor Stone clerked for Justice
Brennan. The two professors also co-author, with a few others, one of the leading
constitutional law textbooks.36 Professor Tushnet specializes in constitutional law
and theory. He has written extensively regarding the practice of judicial review,
both in this country and around the world. He has authored numerous articles and
books on constitutional law, constitutional history and judicial review, and has
won several book awards. One of these books, Making Civil Rights Law,37 traces
the life of Thurgood Marshall and his work before the Supreme Court from 1936
to 1961.
In short, our panelists are eminently qualified to speak on today's topic. We




I'm happy to be here and really glad that the ACS lawyer chapter here is
sponsoring this event. Justice Marshall was a great storyteller. I'm not such a
good storyteller, but I am going to try to tell four stories about Justice Marshall,
or stories that he told. Justice Marshall's stories always had a point, and I've
chosen stories that I think also have a point.
The stories all deal with Marshall when he was a lawyer. The first is this: He
regularly took the subway from his office in midtown Manhattan to his apartment
at the best address in Harlem. He would get out of the subway and walk along
the street, greeted by the gamblers on the comer and the various, as he would put
it, "low-lifes," who would joke with him by asking, "What have you done for us
today, Lawyer Marshall." He would talk with them, and then he would go to his
apartment and entertain Duke Ellington and the other members of the Harlem
elite in the evening.
The second story is about Marshall taking an application for a stay of
execution in a capital case to Fred Vinson's house, and knocking on the door.
Vinson comes out with his sandals on and shuffles out and invites Marshall in
after Marshall says why he's there. Marshall looks around and notices he's
interrupted Vinson's poker game with Harry Truman and a couple other members
of the administration. And Vinson says, "Sit down, why don't you have a drink
with us?"
36. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUIONAL LAW (15th ed. 2005).
37. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COuRT 1936-1961 (1994).
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The third story is a story Marshall told about a young lawyer-it's not clear
to me that it was him, although he may have wanted to convey that sense-who
was participating in the defense of an African American charged with murder in
the South. The case wraps up, and the jury is sent out to deliberate. And this
young, inexperienced lawyer asks the court clerk, "How long do you think it's
going to take them to render a verdict?" And the court clerk says, "Twelve
minutes." And the young lawyer says, "Twelve minutes? It's a very complicated
case. It's a capital case. How can it take only twelve minutes?" The clerk says,
"Twelve minutes from now." And the lawyer says, "Okay," and goes back and
sits down. And exactly twelve minutes from that time, the jury comes back in
and renders a verdict of guilty. Afterward the lawyer asked the clerk, "How did
you know?" And the clerk says, "That's how long it takes to smoke a cigar."
The fourth story is my favorite. It's about a talk that Marshall gave at a
tribute to a civil rights lawyer in Philadelphia named Raymond Pace Alexander.38
The structure of the talk is this: He starts out as speakers do with some joking
remarks, "I'm really happy to be here to be able to honor Raymond Pace
Alexander, even though I had to leave the warm climate in Florida to come up
here to wintery Philadelphia, where it's really cold and unpleasant." He goes on
to talk about Alexander's civil rights practice, how important the work that
Alexander has been doing is, and he ends with an explanation of why he had been
in Florida in the warm climate. The reason was that he was investigating the
assassination of an NAACP leader named Harry Moore, who had been leading
a voter registration campaign in Florida. So, the joke that he starts out with turns
out to have some very serious background.
Those are the four stories. Now, Justice Marshall actually never would tell
you the point of his stories. You were supposed to figure them out yourself. I'm
going to tell you the point of these stories.
Last summer, we heard a lot about the appropriateness of the judicial capacity
for empathy. What these stories are about is the way a person like Justice
Marshall developed empathy across an enormous range of human experience.
One of the parts of the conversation last summer suggested that somehow the
notion of empathy was limiting. But Marshall's empathy was expansive.
Because he could joke with the gamblers and low-lifes in Harlem and then
entertain Duke Ellington, because he had defended capital defendants, and sit
down and have a drink with Fred Vinson. Because he knew about the
assassination of Harry Moore, he could understand why people in Philadelphia
needed to care about civil rights.
Judge Jerome Frank in the 1930s wrote a book in which he described Oliver
Wendell Holmes as the completely adult judge.39 I don't know whether that's
true of Holmes, but I'm pretty confident that it was true of Justice Marshall. He
was a person who knew who he was, knew what he believed, and was not
uncomfortable with any of those things. He was, as we would now say,
38. The text of the talk can be found in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS,
ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 138-44 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
39. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 253 (4th ed. 1935).
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comfortable in his skin. But, there's a line that he would use about that skin. He
would say, whenever he woke up, wherever he was in this country, he never had
to look in the mirror to know what race he was. Being adult meant understanding
what it was to be a black man in America, and what it was to be a white person
in America, as well.
PROFESSOR STONE:
Justice Brennan was a remarkable person. Part of what made him so
extraordinary was that he was filled with joy. He always had a sparkle in his eye,
a kind word, and a hand on your arm when he spoke with you. He looked you
squarely in the eye, was always sympathetic and supportive, and almost always
generous in his evaluations of others. The three exceptions I can recall were
Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, and Warren Burger. Other than those three,
he was always extremely generous in spirit.
Brennan was a very hard worker. He came into the office every morning
before 7:30, so he could review all of the work his law clerks had left him late the
night before. He met with the clerks every morning for coffee for an hour, during
which time we discussed the cases on the docket, drafts of opinions we had
written, or cert petitions he'd reviewed by himself. He was the only Justice who
read all the cert petitions himself. We also talked about the Vietnam War,
Watergate, and the Washington Redskins. Brennan was a real person. He was
smart, kindhearted, thoughtful, and exuberant.
The '73 Term was difficult for Brennan. It was personally difficult because
his wife was very ill during that time, but also difficult because it was a year of
transition. When he arrived at the Court, during the heyday of the Warren era, he
was a central figure in putting together many of the Court's momentous majority
opinions. Brennan was famous for his ability to forge compromises and round
up the fifth vote. He reveled in that role.
But with the appointment by President Nixon of Rehnquist, Blackmun,
Powell and-who am I forgetting? Burger, yes, of course, Burger. That's
Brennan speaking through me! Forget Burger, right? With that change in the
makeup of the Court, Brennan's role changed. As the center of the Court shifted
significantly to the right, Brennan increasingly found himself in dissent.
Although he later came to relish the role of the dissenter, he certainly wasn't
yet there. At this point, he very much felt personally the defeats in the Court.
These were defeats, he felt, not only for himself, but for the nation. On more than
a few occasions, he came back from conference, sat down with his three law
clerks, and ran through the votes at conference with tears in his eyes. He was
deeply frustrated, and sometimes quite angry, that these Justices were dismantling
some of the achievements of the Warren Court.
Two cases in the 1973 Term illustrate a lot about Brennan. They give a
concrete sense of Brennan's efforts to recruit the often elusive "fifth vote," the
meaning of Brennan's conception of the living Constitution, and the extent to
which Brennan, like all justices and judges, was influenced by his own personal
background and values. For Brennan, I think the central formative experience
concerned his father, who was a labor organizer in New Jersey, and who suffered
oppression and even police beatings in his effort to promote the cause of labor.
I think this helped Brennan develop a healthy skepticism about the government's
2010]
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treatment of racial and other minorities, political and religious dissenters, and
other outsiders. I think this shaped his understanding of the Constitution, his role
as a Justice, and his conception of a living Constitution.
So, let me briefly offer two examples. The first were the obscenity cases
decided in 1973, Miller v. California, 4 and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.4,
These cases represented the Court's first comprehensive attempt to revisit the
issue of obscenity since 1957, when Brennan wrote the majority opinion for the
Court in Roth v. United States,42 holding that obscenity is not protected by the
First Amendment.
By 1973, Brennan had come to the view, as had Justices Marshall, Stewart,
and Douglas, that the challenge of defining obscenity with sufficient clarity to
meet First Amendment standards was simply insurmountable. They therefore
concluded that there needed to be a sharper limitation on the scope of the
doctrine. Brennan concluded that obscenity could not constitutionally be
restricted for consenting adults.
The question was whether Brennan could get the fifth vote he needed to make
this the majority view. As it turned out, Brennan decided that Justice Powell was
his best prospect, and Brennan worked tirelessly on Powell for months leading
up to the oral argument in the case. Powell indicated that he was open to
Brennan's approach. As he thought about Brennan's arguments, Powell
suggested that he was inclined in this direction.
Now, the problem was that Powell, a white Southern gentleman, had a vision
of obscenity that consisted of something like Lady Chatterley's Lover,43 or Tom
Jones.' When he went into the Supreme Court's movie theater to see the very
raunchy films that were actually at issue in these cases, he was shocked. As
Brennan later told the story, as he and Powell walked out of the Supreme Court
theater, Powell turned to Brennan and said, "You lose." And so Brennan never
got his fifth vote. In the end, he wrote the lead dissenting opinion. Nonetheless,
this case illustrates the efforts Brennan made to get the fifth vote, the frustration
he felt when he did not succeed, and also his idea of a living Constitution.
Part of the idea of a living Constitution for Brennan was that the Court should
learn with experience. One of the things Brennan learned in the obscenity context
was that the doctrine didn't work very well in practice. Thus, although Brennan
continued to believe, in principle, that obscenity is not protected speech, he also
came to the view that it needed to be more narrowly defined and more limited in
its application, in order to function well in the real world.
The second example is Frontiero v. Richardson,45 which Rosalie already
mentioned. In Frontiero, Brennan took the view that discrimination against
women is in many ways analogous to discrimination against African-Americans
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
41. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
42. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43. D.H. LAWRENCE, LADY's CHArrERLEY'S LOVER (Penguin Books 1994) (1928).
44. HENRY FiELDiNG, TOM JoNEs (1922).
45. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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and is therefore presumptively unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause." Brennan reasoned that, even though the Court had never interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause in this way, society had changed so greatly over the
years that our understanding of "equality" must change as well.
In this case, too, Brennan was disappointed in his hope to get a majority to
embrace his view. In conference, the Justices had voted 8-1 to invalidate the law,
but they had voted to do so on the ground that the law was irrational. On further
reflection, Brennan decided that this was an intellectually dishonest position,
because the challenged law was clearly rational under the Court's accepted
doctrine. He therefore argued instead that women constitute a "suspect class" and
that discrimination against women therefore requires strict scrutiny. Justices
Marshall, Douglas, and White promptly joined Brennan's opinion. And then
there was silence. Months passed. Justices Powell and Stewart, the two members
of the Court most likely to join Brennan's opinion, both argued that it was unwise
for the Court to reach this issue in light of the fact that the Equal Rights
Amendment was still pending. In the end, they filed separate concurring
opinions,47 arguing that the law was irrational, and Brennan never got his fifth
vote.
These examples illustrate how Brennan acted out of his conception of a living
Constitution, how he tried to pull together a majority opinion, and by the 1973
Term how frequently he was frustrated in his effort to do so. It was, for Justice
Brennan, a trying year.
Thank you.
JUSTICE BOEHM:
Well, I was at the Court almost a decade before my two colleagues and at the
height of what was then perceived to be the Warren Court. You had Mapp v.
Ohio48 in 1961 and Gideon v. Wainwright49 in '62. These are still cases that I
expect most lawyers recognize by case name, even those who don't practice
criminal law. And then we ended up with Reynolds v. Sims50 that I'll talk about
some more later, all of which were viewed as revolutionary decisions at the time.
Most of them were 5-4 decisions. Each of them set a major conflict in place
between structural considerations of federalism and basic questions of human
liberty, and came out in each case essentially on the side of the Equal Protection
Clause5' and the Due Process Clause, 52 trumping whatever federalism or other
considerations were thought to be in play. But to speak about the Chief, as we all
called him, as a human being, he, too, was a product of his history, which as I
think most of you know, was essentially as a politician. He was an extremely
successful governor of California. Before that he was the attorney general. He
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring).
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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was a baseball fan, a schmoozer, a politician par excellence, and a man of
enormous personal charm and dignity and compassion. I don't know anybody
who didn't like him.
We also had our post-Friday conferences as law clerks with our Justice. I
don't know if every chamber did this, but the drill would be conferences were
always on Friday at that time. And after the conference adjourned, the clerks
would be called in to explain the results.
And occasionally, you'd have a case where the results surprised me. One
example that sticks in my mind today is a case where we had a cert petition from
the Alabama Supreme Court by a man who was the then president of the Alabama
NAACP, who had been arrested by a state trooper in Alabama, and they had
convicted him of-I've forgotten what-disorderly conduct or something. And
I had looked at this case left, right and sideways and concluded that they had
adequate state law grounds for doing everything they'd done, and there really
wasn't anything we could do about this, even though it certainly looked like an
abuse of power. And we come back from conference and the Chief says, "Well,
we've granted cert." I said, "Well, what do you think about that?" And he said,
"They can't do that." That was-and he was right. He was right. All the fancy
Harvard Law Review analysis that I'd come up with reached the wrong result.
And that was based, in the Chief's view, on his understanding of how the
world really worked. He'd been a governor for three years. He'd dealt with state
legislators. He knew how they operated. More about that later. And he brought
that to the Court in a way that some people might feel is somewhat lacking in
today's jurisprudence where we have a bench that is largely filled with people
with appellate bench credentials and histories that can get you confirmed and
produces a very highly qualified bench, but also has the effect of screening out
people of the broad breadth of background of the Court I dealt with. You had
Tom Clark, and Earl Warren, Justice Brennan, Justice Black, of course, was a
senator.
And, by the way, if you could say there was a dominant figure in the Court
in that day, it would be Black. He was the one who really staked out strong
positions and stiffened the backbone of the other Justices and the majority, as
perceived by me. And I think history has pretty much borne that out.
But the Chief was also a great human being. And he would take us to the
late, not particularly lamented Washington Senators games, and there we'd be in
a box with Sergeant Shriver watching a ball game and just enjoying a ball game.
The other thing he would do is, the drill was we'd all work on Saturday mornings
and then go to lunch at a place called the National Lawyers' Club, which I think
passed away many years ago. At least I haven't heard of it for many years. But
it was on, I think, H Street in Washington, and it was just what you'd expect it to
be, an all male, all lawyers luncheon club. And we'd have lunch for maybe two
or three hours. And those two or three hours would be spent almost exclusively
on sports and politics, hardly ever touching on a matter of law. The Chief loved
to just schmooze on subjects of general interest. And he was very good at it. He
was a charming guy. It was a great experience.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON:
Thanks to all of you for providing wonderful insights into the character of
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these three Justices. I guess I would make one observation. Although members
of the Court in the 1960s and '70s may have reflected a better cross section of
experiences, we should remember that there was no woman's voice, no female
Justice until a decade later. But I would like now to zero in on what each of you
believes was the most significant decision that your Justice wrote or dissented
from while you were clerking and/or maybe the most difficult case.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:
For me, probably it was the dissent in the Rodriguez school finance case,53
which I didn't work on. Another one of my co-clerks worked on it as his primary
job for several months. And it was not difficult, it was disappointing because the
judge thought correctly that at some level his career had been built on the notion
that equality with respect to education was the foundation of equal citizenship in
the United States. And here were these kids who, as he saw it, weren't being
treated equally, weren't getting the kind of education that other kids were getting.
The doctrinal issues were tricky, but not insurmountable.
After Rodriguez was handed down, another historian showed Justice Marshall
a draft opinion in Brown v. Board of Education54 in which Chief Justice Warren
had written that education was a fundamental right in the United States. Warren
revised the opinion and took out that particular phrasing. Marshall said that, if he
had published that, he would have made my job in Rodriguez much easier. And
it was disheartening to him that the majority couldn't see what he thought was so
obvious, that, if there was anything that the United States should be committed
to, it should be equality with respect to education.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON.
May I ask a quick follow-up question on equal educational opportunity? A
year ago, in Parents Involved," the United States Supreme Court struck down
efforts by two school districts to achieve desegregation by using race as a factor
in assigning students to public schools. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked Brown v. Board of Education to invalidate the plans.5 6 Any comments
on that, Mark?
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:
Well, this is a case that was made for the phrase that, if Justice Marshall were
alive today, he'd be turning over in his grave. The particular quotations that the
Chief Justice used from both Brown and more important from the oral argument
in Brown were accurate, and they were statements about color-blindness and the
impropriety of using race as a basis for assigning kids to schools. That's what
they said. I found it interesting that the quotation is from an oral argument made
by Robert Carter,57 rather than by Thurgood Marshall. Marshall said the same
53. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 73 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
55. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
56. Id. at 746 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Brown I,
347 U.S. at 483).
57. Id. at 747 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 483 (Robert L.
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things when he argued, but the Chief Justice quoted Carter rather than Marshall,
I think, out of a strategic sense. It's one thing to say Robert Carter said this. It
would be an insult to Thurgood Marshall to quote Marshall for this decision.
So, Marshall and Carter did say you can't use race as a basis for assigning
kids to schools. There's no question about that. But they said that in the service
of a larger vision about what racial equality with respect to education was. The
goal was integration, not merely eliminating the use of race as a categorizing
device. And they said that, as well. They said the goal is integration. There are
parts of the Parents Involved decision that are, I think it's fair to say,
disingenuous. This part isn't in particular disingenuous, it's just, again,
extremely disappointing.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON:
Thank you. Let's move on to Professor Stone?
PROFESSOR STONE:
Certainly the most momentous decision the Court handed down in our Term
was Roe v. Wade."8 Although Brennan didn't write an opinion in Roe, he played
a major role behind the scenes in helping Blackmun craft an opinion that would
both win the Court and be more persuasive than some of the early drafts that had
been circulated. So, in our chambers, we were very much involved in Roe. The
outcome in Roe was fairly clear from early on, but the way the opinion would be
written, how broad or narrow the decision would be, was very much in doubt.
For Brennan, Roe was an interesting challenge. As the Court's only Catholic
Justice, he clearly felt a personal tension between his religious and moral beliefs
about abortion, on the one hand, and his responsibilities as a Justice in
interpreting the Constitution, on the other. Although Brennan did not often
discuss this with the clerks, we did get a sense of how important it was to him not
to allow his religious beliefs affect his position. But at the same time, he also
wanted to make sure that his desire not to be affected by his religious beliefs did
not lead him to a legal judgment that was not a sound one. It was impressive to
watch the way he worked this through.
The Justices understood, of course, that Roe was an important, difficult, and
controversial decision that would have a substantial effect on society. They also
knew that the decision would have a certain degree of short-term political fallout,
but I don't think anyone within the Court-Justices or law clerks-had the
faintest idea that we'd be today still talking about Roe v. Wade as a fundamental
factor in American politics thirty-seven years later. I don't think any of the
Justices would have predicted that.
The first inkling we got of the depth of the reaction to Roe was from the mail
response to the decision. The Court was inundated with mail, mostly critical.
The boxes were piled up from floor to ceiling in the hallways of the Supreme
Court. The Court had never seen anything quite like this. The only people who
really were interested in going through all this mail were some of the law clerks
who had gone onjob interviews and were waiting for their reimbursement checks.
Carter, Dec. 9, 1952)).
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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They were the ones who were still there at two in the morning elbow deep in the
boxes trying to find their money.
The two Justices who received the most mail were Blackmun and Brennan,
Blackmun because he authored the opinion, Brennan because he was Catholic.
Most of the letters were from children in parochial schools. They were usually
form-letters accusing the Justices of murdering babies. The tone of many of the
letters was pretty brutal. Brennan and Blackmun had very different responses to
the mail. Brennan's approach was not to read it. He felt such correspondence
was not relevant to his role as a Justice, so for the most part he just put it aside.
Blackmun, on the other hand, seemed fascinated by these letters. There was
a moment when I saw Blackmun, which I thought was very poignant. Over time
I've come to believe, perhaps unrealistically, that that moment was pivotal in
Blackmun's evolution as a Justice and as a person. It was late at night, maybe
one or two in the morning, and I was still in the Court working on something or
other. I was dealing with a case with one of Blackmun's law clerks. I went to
Blackmun's chambers to see if the clerk was still around. Everyone was gone,
except Blackmun. All the lights were out in Blackmun's chambers, except for a
small green reading light on Blackmun's desk. He was sitting there, almost in the
dark, with his glasses down around his nose and a big pile of these letters on his
desk. He was reading them, one by one. I remember just standing there silently,
watching him, and it struck me as so moving that he was allowing himself to feel
the pain of being the target of such animosity, condemnation, and disapproval.
What I came to believe over time is that it was this experience that changed
Blackmun as a person and that led him to be someone who, like Marshall,
Brennan, and Warren, began to think about the outsiders in society, about what
it felt like to be a dissenter, to be the one who is despised. I think that experience
initiated an important transition in Blackmun's understanding of his
responsibilities as a Justice, and ultimately changed the way he fulfilled his
judicial responsibilities. I believe this capacity for empathy-to use an overused
term these days-made him a better Justice.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON:
Thank you.
As a side note, Professor Stone, I recall that you wrote a piece after the very
controversial Gonzales59 decision sustaining the federal "partial birth abortion"
statute, in which you noted that all five of the Catholics on the Court were in the
majority, whereas the four non-Catholics joined in the dissent.6° It was important
to Justice Brennan to keep his religious beliefs separate from his legal opinions.
Professor Stone, isn't it fair to say more broadly that Justice Brennan was a
separationist when it came to the Establishment Clause,6 while he also authored
Sherbert v. Verner, 2 in which he advocated a very protective interpretation of the
59. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
60. Posting of Geoffrey Stone to The Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolawtypepad.com/faculty/
2007/04/ourfaithbased_.html (Apr. 20, 2007, 15:01).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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rights of religious minorities under the Free Exercise Clause.63
PROFESSOR STONE:
Right. Brennan had strong views about religious freedom. I think
"separationist" is the right way to put it. He believed deeply in the separation of
church and state. He also believed deeply in the protection of religious
minorities, as he believed in the protection of any minority group. He therefore
championed the view that laws that had disparate effects on minority religions
must be considered very carefully and merited serious scrutiny.
Now, let me say a word about the piece I wrote about Gonzalez.64 Six years
before Gonzalez, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down a Nebraska statute
prohibiting partial birth abortions, because the law did not have an exception for
the life or the health of the mother.65 In Gonzalez, the Court considered a federal
law prohibiting partial birth abortions that also did not include an exception for
the life or the health of the mother. But this time, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
upheld the law. 66 In my view, the opinion in Gonzalez was completely
disingenuous in its effort to distinguish the earlier decision. The only real
change, as far as I was concerned, was that Justice O'Connor had been replaced
by Justice Alito.67 O'Connor had been the fifth vote in the first case.68 Alito was
the fifth vote for the opposite result in Gonzalez.69
In the op-ed you've referred to,70 I asked, what is it about this issue that
would drive these Justices to feel such a powerful need to produce so
disingenuous an opinion? Why couldn't they just either follow the clearly
controlling precedent or, if need be, be honest about it and take up the challenge
of directly overruling it (which I didn't think it could justify in any principled
way)?
I noticed that all five Justices in the majority in Gonzalez were Catholic. That
led me to write the piece, wondering whether the religion of the Justices had
affected their conduct. As I've already noted, I do believe that Justices are
affected by their personal experiences and values, and this is true of conservative
Justices as well as of liberals. So I posed the question whether these Justices
might have been unwilling to follow the precedent because they so despised the
idea of partial birth abortion that they just could not "morally" bring themselves
to do so. I contrasted this scenario with how I had seen Justice Brennan struggle
with this challenge in Roe.7
This piece received much more attention on the Internet than I had
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.
65. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
66. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168.
67. Adam Liptak, O'Connor Casts a Long Shadow on the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2006, at Al.
68. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 918-19.
69. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 130.




expected,7 2 but the most interesting response was from Justice Scalia. He had
been my colleague on the faculty at the University of Chicago in the 1970s, and
we were friends. A student came to me about six months after this piece was
published, and said, "Did you know that Justice Scalia said that he would not set
foot in the University of Chicago Law School again as long as you're on the
faculty?" I said, "Not possible. That's ridiculous."
Then about six months ago Joan Biskupic, a very fine reporter and author,
called me to say she was writing a biography of Scalia73 and wanted to discuss his
reaction to my piece on Gonzalez. She said that during one of her interviews of
Scalia, she'd asked him about my piece, and he had jumped up from his chair and
exclaimed, among other things, "I'm never going to set foot in the University of
Chicago Law School again as long as Stone is on the faculty." In effect, he
accused me of being bigoted against Catholics, although that missed my point
entirely. To get the full account of this incident, you should read Biskupic's
book, An American Original,74 which is actually quite good. The point is simply
that these issues touch nerves.
JUSTICE BOEHM."
Well, the answer to the most important decision in my Term is easy. The
Chief himself thought that Reynolds v. Sims75 was not only the most important
decision of the 1963 Term,7 6 but the most important decision of his tenure on the
Court, including Brown v. Board ofEducation 77 and all the other decisions. Often
when I make that comment I get a lot of raised eyebrows, particularly from
younger audiences that have never heard of Reynolds v. Sims. Many people seem
to think that there is a one person, one vote clause in the Constitution somewhere.
Not so.
Reynolds v. Sims was a decision involving the apportionment of the Alabama
state legislature, which was severely mal-apportioned.78 Let me describe the
situation in Indiana since this is largely a Hoosier audience. In Indiana, the 1960
election when John Kennedy was elected president, was conducted on legislative
and congressional maps that were based on the 1920 census.7 9 There had been no
reapportionment for forty years. And a culture of "let's continue to protect our
own backsides" had dominated the legislature to the point where reapportionment
was a subject that was really largely off the table within the legislature.
In the meantime, beginning from 1920 to 1960, as you might expect, there
72. Posting of Geoffrey Stone to The Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/
2007/04/faithbasedjus.html (Apr. 25, 2007, 9:09).
73. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: TIE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2009).
74. Id. at 202-05.
75. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
76. The case was argued November 13, 1963 and decided June 15, 1964. Id.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
78. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537-38.
79. Howard D. Hamilton et al., Legislature Reapportionment in Indiana: Some Observations
anda Suggestion, 35 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 368 (1959-60).
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had been dramatic shifts in the population centers of this state. At that time,
Indiana had eleven congressional districts. The district in the southeastern
quadrant of the state, that is one of the least populated and in many configurations
came to be represented for many years by Lee Hamilton, had a population of
roughly one fifth that of Marion County, which was also a congressional district.
So, you had a five to one disparity in the numbers of people who were electing
one congressman.
The same phenomenon existed in the state legislatures. It's more complicated
to explain it because the districts were smaller. But basically, you had massive
malapportionment of the state legislature in relationship to the population as it
then sat. Reynolds v. Sims invoked the Equal Protection Clause0 to hold that you
can't do that. You have to essentially have one person, one vote in both houses
of the legislature.
Now, this was highly controversial. As Professor Levinson noted, it
restructured American democracy. What it did was shift the center of gravity of
the state legislatures in many parts of the country, and certainly Indiana,
essentially from rural and small town districts to the suburbs. It didn't so much
shift it to the cities themselves, because they already were significant forces. But
the suburban areas-to take Marion County that most people in this room are
familiar with, at the time Reynolds v. Sims was decided, Indianapolis and the
metropolitan area was all inside Marion County. The surrounding counties, the
ones that those of us who live here call the "donut counties" around Marion
County, were essentially rural and farm areas. As you know, Hamilton County
to the north of Indianapolis is now the fifth most populated county in the state.
The one person, one vote requirement didn't effect a shift of power from
Democrats to Republicans or vice versa. But what it did is shift representation
from small town and rural interests to suburban areas, and created a legislature
that then proceeded over the ensuing several decades to be much more responsive
to concerns like consumerism and environmentalism.
A lot of the relatively modest progressive movements that evolved through
the '70s and '80s simply could not have happened at the state level without
Reynolds v. Sims mandating that the legislatures fix this imbalance, which the fox
in charge of that henhouse had no interest in fixing itself. And the effect of that
was not just to enable a broad range of basically progressive movements to
become implemented at the state level, it was also to revive federalism. It made
the states more responsive in dealing with a lot of the problems that had, through
the New Deal in successive years, because of a default by the state in dealing with
them, been forced onto the federal agenda. And the result is of enormous historic
consequence, I think. And the Chief was absolutely right. It cut across the board
and affected virtually every aspect of American life.
I would like to comment on a case that didn't get decided-in a very peculiar
way. The case that we thought that was going to be the biggest case of the 1963
Term was Bell v. Maryland." Now, how many of you know Bell v. Maryland?
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.




Bell v. Maryland came to us as a sit-in case from Maryland.82 It was a classic
case of an African American that had been rejected admittance to a lunch counter.
This had happened all over the country, and Mr. Bell brought his claim purely
under the Fourteenth Amendment.83 His claim was that the Fourteenth
Amendment is self-effectuating, and prohibits discrimination in public facilities
without need of any implementing legislation by Congress. That claim wended
its way through the Maryland state courts and the Maryland Court of Appeals
said, no, there's no such federal claim. Cert comes up to the U.S. Supreme Court
and the case arrives about the same time I do in August of 1963.
This case, if decided in favor of the plaintiffs, would have been a judicial
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in effect. It would have been a
declaration that the Constitution in and of itself, without any need of
congressional action, prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in public
facilities. And there's nothing in the case that would have restricted its
application. It would have been Brown against the Board, not just for schools but
for everything. You can imagine what a monumental decision this was.
Well, the case grinds forward, and on November 22, 1963, a date ingrained
in the memory of most people my age, President Kennedy was killed. Lyndon
Johnson becomes president, and over the course of the next several months,
Johnson gets the Civil Rights Act through the Congress of the United States. The
Maryland General Assembly then responds with a public accommodations law
of its own in Maryland. And the case that is thought to become this historic,
ultimate high water of-to use the term of opponents-an activist court, is
decided on the basis that, well, Maryland might have changed its mind in light of
this intervening legislation, so we're going to send the case back to Maryland to
see whether, in the light of either the federal act or the state act, they want to
change their minds on this prosecution. And as far as I know, that issue has never
been resolved to this day, whether the Fourteenth Amendment would have
achieved the same result without it. It would have been a yet unprecedented view
of the state action requirement. There were all these arguments for state action.
We license corporations. We provide police protection to them. There were a
whole bunch of arguments as to what was sufficient.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON.-
No. No, if anything the Court has generally narrowed the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Boehm, you were talking about Reynolds v. Sims," which facilitated
real democracy. It reminded me of campaign finance reform and the Court's
recent decision that invalidated longstanding limits on corporate spending85 and
overturned Justice Marshall's opinion in the Austin case," in which he decried the
82. Id. at 227.
83. Id. at 228 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1).
84. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
86. Id. at 913 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
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corrosive effect of corporate wealth on elections.8 7 Because we don't have a lot
of time left, it might be interesting to talk more broadly about judicial activism,
as well as the current debate about the politicization of the Supreme Court. When
all three of you clerked, the same complaints about the politicization of the Court
were heard-just in the other direction. How, if at all, was the liberal Warren
Court different?
PROFESSOR STONE:
I think there is a lot of similarity, at least in a superficial sense, between
liberal activism and conservative activism. But I'd make two points about this
issue. First, there is the problem of defining what we mean by a "conservative"
justice. When Richard Nixon appointed Burger, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and
Powell, they were thought of as conservative justices. But their understanding of
conservatism meant that they believed in judicial restraint. They were appointed
to resist the activism of the Warren Court. The conservative argument at the time
was that activism is bad, passivism is good. The conservative Justice was thus
one who would invalidate laws only in extraordinary circumstances, where the
finding of unconstitutionality was clear. This was the prevailing conception of
a conservative Justice throughout the era of the Burger Court. It is interesting, by
the way, that despite that understanding, three of the four Nixon appointees voted
in the majority in Roe v. Wade. 8 Without their support, the decision would have
come out the other way.
Basically, though, judicial restraint was the catchword of judicial
conservatism at that time. In American politics today, that remains the public
conception of a conservative Justice. A conservative Justice "calls balls and
strikes," and does not exercise any kind of activist judicial review. That is an
entirely inaccurate description of the current conservatives on the Supreme Court,
however. In decisions like Heller,9 the Second Amendment case; Citizens
United,90 the corporate campaign finance case; and in the Court's affirmative
action, commercial advertising, and federalism decisions, the Court's
"conservative" Justices have been extremely activist. In all of those cases, and
many more, Justices like Roberts, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito have been
anything but restrained. They have used the power of judicial review every bit
as actively as the Warren Court, but for different reasons. In short, we have seen
a dramatic change in the meaning of judicial conservatism.
Unfortunately, the nature and magnitude of this change has not been
understood by the public, which still clings to the idea that conservative Justices
"apply the law" rather than "invent the law." Because of this, one of the most
serious challenges for the American Constitution Society is to explain to the
public that the conservative Justices are not neutral or passive in their
interpretation of the Constitution, but are aggressively ideological.
The second point I'd like to make concerns the nature of judicial activism.
87. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
90. 130 S. Ct. at 876.
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Justices Brennan, Marshall, Warren, and the other Justices of that era who were
labeled activists had a fundamental vision of when it was appropriate for the
Court to be muscular in its exercise of judicial activism. Basically, they thought
judicial activism was warranted in two situations. First, they believed they had
a special responsibility to protect the rights of religious dissenters, racial
minorities, political dissidents, persons accused of crime, and others whose
interests are likely to be inadequately protected in the majoritarian political
process. Second, they believed the Court has a special responsibility to make sure
that the channels of the political system itself are open and well functioning, as
illustrated by such decision as Reynolds v. Sims9' and New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.92 Almost all of their most controversial decisions fell into one or both
of those categories.
That is, in my view, a sensible and principled understanding of the proper
role of the judiciary in our constitutional system. But if you try to make sense of
the activism of today's conservative Justices, it's very difficult to come up with
any kind of principled or coherent theory that would explain their activist judicial
review. On what theory does the Supreme Court get activist on such issues as the
rights of gun owners, the rights of corporations, the rights of commercial
advertisers, the right of the Boy Scouts to exclude gay scoutmasters, and the
rights of those who oppose affirmative action? As far as I can tell, there is no
principled theory of judicial review or of the role of courts that explains this
pattern of decisions. They just seem to correspond to the ideological
predispositions of political conservatives. That, I think, is a serious problem with
the current Court, and it is a profound difference between Warren Court-era
judicial activism and Roberts Court-era judicial activism.
JUSTICE BOEHM:
One comment on keeping the channels of our political system working
properly, which I take to mean making sure there aren't structural obstacles to the
proper working of government. Just on a personal count, when I was still a
private lawyer, I was lead lawyer for the plaintiffs in a case called Bandemer
against Davis.93 I think it became Davis against Bandemer94 in the Supreme
Court, which was the first case that got to the Supreme Court challenging
gerrymandering as an equal protection violation. And it ended up in a 4-3-2
decision where Justice White wrote the four Justice plurality opinion. The
Indiana General Assembly map in question was obviously a gerrymandered map.
It included a mix of multi-member districts and single member districts-and
districts that were drawn in a way that couldn't possibly be explained on any
basis other than it was designed to elect a Republican legislature. But Justice
White was joined by both Brennan and Marshall in the proposition that, whatever
was going on in Indiana in the 1980 map, it wasn't bad enough according to the
91. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92. 376 U.S. 253 (1964).
93. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).





And we've never figured out what's bad enough, right?
JUSTICE BOEHM:
Nobody's ever come up with anything that is bad enough. There's been a
subsequent Pennsylvania case that wasn't bad enough,96 and so the level to which
Blackmun and Justices Brennan and Marshall were willing to go to open up those
channels obviously had limits-although one way to look at that decision is you
weren't going to get a five-Justice majority anyway, so go along with Justice
White's opinion. I don't know what was in their brains.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:
I have, I think, just two comments. I would emphasize something that Geoff
said in passing, which is that there is an account of when the Roberts Court is
activist. The account says, it's activist by reading the Republican platform. If we
could get that idea across, that would be pretty effective, because I don't think
people think that the Constitution is the Republican platform.
The other thing is this. It would be really nice if the next nominee for the
Supreme Court got up and said,
Damn right, I'm going to be an activist. If the Constitution says the
statute is unconstitutional, I'm going to find it unconstitutional. And if
it doesn't say it's unconstitutional, I'm not going to find it
unconstitutional. That's just what Roberts and Alito do. I'm not going
to do anything different.
People associated with the liberal or progressive side have been scared away from
the word activism when the phenomenon of activism has shifted to the other side
of the spectrum. I never know quite whether this is exactly appropriate, but
there's a U2 performance of the song "Helter Skelter., 97 They open up with Bono
saying, "Charlie Manson took this away from us, we're going to take it back."
I think that's what we ought to do about activism. We ought to take it back.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON:
I think that's an important observation. Statistically, the Rehnquist Court, for
example, overturned more acts of Congress than all previous Supreme Courts
combined. 98 This concept of activism is certainly a two-way street.
We are running short on time, so would each of you like to sum up what you
think was the greatest contribution of your Justice? We will then have a little
time for comments and questions from the audience.
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:
Well, for me, it's Brown v. Board of Education.99 That was his opinion, as
95. Id. at 143.
96. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
97. U2, HELTER SKELTER (Island 1988) (cover of THE BEArrLES, HELTER SKELTER (Apple
Records (1968)).
98. THE CONSTrruTIoN IN 2020, at 39 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds. 2009).
99. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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far as I'm concerned.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON:
And his work to make that happen. That's true.
PROFESSOR STONE:
For Brennan, I think it was the First Amendment. Brennan became a vocal
champion of the First Amendment during his tenure on the Court and he was an
extremely important and influential thinker about the meaning of free speech.
That is probably his greatest achievement. He transformed the way we think
about the freedom of speech and press.
JUSTICE BOEHM:
All of the above. The Chief was able to get a majority together and
sometimes even a unanimous Court on extremely controversial subjects. To try
and pull one of them out, just try and consider what America would be like
without some of these keystones.
DINO POLLOCK.-
We're going to take the last five, six minutes or so to take your questions. If
you would, please stand up or raise your hand, we'll recognize you and then you
can address your question to either the entire panel or one particular panelist.
UNKNOWN SPEAKER:
This is to Justice Boehm. Did Earl Warren ever discuss the internment of
Japanese during World War II, during your time?
JUSTICE BOEHM:
Not with me. I don't-I never heard him address the subject.
UNKNOWN SPEAKER:
Justice Scalia once said that no other Justice was as powerful as Justice
Brennan because the Constitution was this pliable thing, the notion of which was
such that he could say, oh does it mean one hundred percent, does it mean fifty
percent, what does it mean, where as I, Justice Scalia, see a document and I make
decisions based on that. My second question is that based on his view that if you
look at the language as it was understood by objective person at that time, which
in 1791 meant sabers and muskets, do you feel like the Heller decision betrayed
what he purports to be as his perspective?
PROFESSOR STONE:
Well, the danger in a kind of open-ended and aspirational conception of the
Constitution is that it can be an unbounded premise on which to interpret the
often very ambiguous words of the Constitution. That is a potential problem. We
need some constraint to give a sense of structure, direction, and legitimacy to
constitutional interpretation.
It is certainly possible, however, to identify the values that are the central
aspirations of those provisions and that can be analyzed in an appropriate,
constrained, and logical manner. But the challenge is certainly a real one.
With respect to Scalia, I'm not a great fan of his version of originalism. First
of all, though, I should emphasize that I think the idea of an aspirational, living
constitutionalism is originalist. That methodology attempts to implement an
originalist meaning, but with the recognition that, in adopting phrases like,
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"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech," ' 0 or "no state
shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws,"'' or inflict upon any
person "cruel or unusual punishments,"' °2 the Framers were not enacting a
specific code with a clearly defined meaning. Rather, they understood full well
that they were adopting provisions that were vague, open-ended, and would have
to gain meaning over time.
On the other hand, the form of originalism that seeks to fix the meaning of
these provisions in terms of what the Framers specifically intended or expected
is largely a ruse. For one thing, the Framers themselves never intended the
Constitution to be construed in this way, so the basic premise of this sort of
originalism is inherently contrary to originalism. But beyond that, lawyers are
not particularly good historians and, in any event, we often know very little about
what the Framers themselves actually intended or expected. As a consequence,
when purporting to undertake this sort of inquiry, "originalists" typically go
through the following thought process: "Well, what did the Framers intend?
Well, the Framers were reasonable people. I'm a reasonable person. So, the
Framers must have intended what I would have intended had I been there at the
time." So, conservative "originalists" hold affirmative action unconstitutional,
they hold that the Boy Scouts have a First Amendment right to exclude gay
scoutmasters, they hold the regulation of guns unconstitutional, they hold that
corporations have First Amendment rights, and so on. None of that is in any
credible way an "originalist" understanding of the Constitution. Rather, such
decisions simply illustrate how "originalist" Justices smuggle their own values
into the Constitution by conveniently attributed them to the Framers, who (for all





Let me just say that Professor Tushnet's provocative comment that we should
recapture the term activism, isn't it true that a century ago the activists were the
conservatives? And so, the call for recapturing seems to have a very sound basis
in history after all the Lochner1" Court was criticized for activism, right?
PROFESSOR TUSHNET:
Certainly. Another way of putting the point about recapturing the term
"activism" is that, what we on my side of the political spectrum need to do is
remove the term activism from the vocabulary because it doesn't tell us anything.
There are conservative activists and there are liberal activists. If you're a liberal,
you want liberal activism and you don't want conservative activism. But it's not
activism that's at stake. It's the aspirations of the Constitution. There are
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
103. Indiana Supreme Court Associate Justice Frank Sullivan.
104. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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conservative visions of an aspirational Constitution, too. That's a discussion we
could have. But having a discussion about whether somebody's an activist or not
is just not productive.
MR. POLLOCK:
Thank you so much for coming out and we appreciate your time.

